BROADSIDES

September 25, 2002

BIOLOGICAL FIRST-STRIKE? It's an interesting coincidence that the day before British Prime Minister Tony Blair addressed Parliament on Saddam's plans to use chemical and biological weapons, Jane's Security re-posted an excerpt of a chilling report about the Soviet Union's unsecured biological weapons inventory. The report, written by Andy Oppenheimer, was originally posted on the Jane's Chem-Bio Web site earlier this month.

Oppenheimer writes:

The Soviet biological weapons (BW) arsenal included the causative agents of anthrax, smallpox, plague, tularemia, glanders, Ebola and Marburg. Soviet BW scientists also developed anti-crop and anti-livestock agents . . . Apart from attempts by Iran and other countries to hire underpaid or displaced Russian BW specialists to work on BW development programs, the security of biological materials sites in countries of the former Soviet Union remains a growing concern.

Out of some 50 former Soviet BW sites, Vector in western Siberia is one of the biggest and, according to the US DoD, continues to maintain a culture collection that includes over 15,000 viral strains, including Marburg and Ebola. It is also one of the world’s two authorized smallpox repositories. The State Research Center for Applied Microbiology (Obolensk) contains a 2,000-microorganism collection that includes genetically engineered strains of anthrax and other dangerous pathogens . . .

Several instances have been reported of theft or diversion of dangerous pathogens, including smallpox, plague, and anthrax, from institutes in Russia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. The DoD noted that providing physical security is difficult because of the small size of pathogen vials. Also, pathogens cannot be detected using X-ray machines. For example, a seed culture of dried anthrax spores could be carried in a sealed plastic vial the size of a thumbnail, making detection almost impossible. Pathogens could also be sold to terrorist groups or "rogue states" . . .

The BW research program also had as many as six facilities employing some 10,000 scientists to develop anti-agricultural weapons, including the Biologics Plant and another facility in Pokrov. According to Igor Domaradsky, former chairman of the Soviet Interagency Science and Technology Council on Molecular Biology and Genetics, Pokrov was "one of the biggest" facilities that developed agricultural weapons, including foot-and-mouth disease, to target livestock, poultry and plants . . .

. . . the Washington Post reported in June 2002 that the [Pokrov] facility is crumbling and poorly guarded. US officials say many viruses are housed in a dilapidated compound that has a patched-up alarm system and is manned by ageing [sic] guards. In addition, due to underfunding, Pokrov is struggling to keep its underpaid scientists. Gavrilov admits there have been break-ins, as well as attempts at purchasing materials.

Considering that Iraq had strong ties with the Soviet Union, it doesn't take a leap to conclude that Iraq used its contacts to steal or buy Soviet biological weapon materials. Nor does it take a leap to assume that by now, Saddam has deliverable bio weapons and fully intends to use them in a first-strike context.

B. Sides @ 7:40 AM